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The analysts of the Romanian Academic Society (SAR) argue that 2006 will be 
a rather good year from the economic point of view, with a further reduction 
of the inflation and of the account deficits and with a reasonable economic 
growth. Since the beginning of the year, the trend of accelerating reforms 
has been noticeable, especially in the fields of justice and anti-corruption, 
trying to avoid the activation of safeguard clauses and trying to convince the 
European Union that Romania is prepared for accession. Clearly, in 2006 
Romania has a healthier economic environment compared to 2004. In 
addition, media, civil society and recently even the Prosecutor’s Office are 
much more active in exposing high-level corruption. Our report makes 
forecasts on the economic evolution, it discusses the recent positive 
developments in the field of justice and anti-corruption fight but also deals 
with other consolidated aspects that risk to affect the performance of 
Romania during and after accession. SAR analyses the capacity of 
absorption of EU funds and transparency of the administration. The recent 
survey conducted by SAR shows that the performance of the administration 
increased compared to 2003 but this increase features just in quantity and it is 
rather chaotic instead of a qualitative and planned improvement. Many 
public bodies lack awareness on the difficulties likely to arise when dealing 
with a growing level of European funding.  Without a significant political effort 
targeted at increasing the capacity of the public administration, Romania will 
face a considerable risk to end up using just small amount of the funds 
allotted by the Union. We actually risk failing a new Marshall plan, much more 






            FORECASTS 
 
 
SAR interviewed in February 2006 its usual panel of economists1 on the 
most important developments this year will bring. Some open questions 
regarding the significant trends in the Romanian economy were included 
as well. This introductory section presents a brief summary of the answers 
received.  
MAIN MACROECONOMIC INDICATORS FOR 2006  
 Average  Margin (min-max) 
GDP Growth, % 4.6 3 – 5 
Inflation Rate, % 7.1 6 – 8 
RON/Euro Exchange Rate on 31 
Dec 2006 
3.48 3.42 – 3.65 
Account Deficit, % 8.2 7 – 9.5 
Budget Deficit, % 0.8 0.5 – 1.5 
Stock Exchange Index Raise 
BET, % 
28 20 – 35 
 
One general remark we can make is that our panel, whose members are 
more or less the same as last year, was very cautious in issuing forecasts. 
Natural disasters slowed down the economy unexpectedly last year, 
which contradicted some of our forecasts for 2005: the growth was under 
5%, as opposed to the 6.2% average forecasted by us in January 2005; the 
stock exchange index BET only rose by 51%, as opposed to the average 
forecast of 62%. On the other hand, we should mention the fact that SAR 
forecasts were, nevertheless, closer to the real values than other forecasts 
issued at the time, for instance those provided by EIU. Moreover, we 
                                                 
1 We are grateful to the following experts for accepting our invitation to take part in the 
panel: Lucian Albu, Institute for Economic Forecasts; Bogdan Baltazar, Baltazar, Bloom & 
Pîrvulescu; Radu Crăciun, senior analyst ABN Amro; Florin Cîţu, chief economist, ING Bank;  
Daniel Dăianu, professor, AES; Aurelian Dochia, general manager, SGG corporate finance; 
Cătălin Păuna, economist, World Bank Mission; Florin Pogonaru, president, Association of 
Romanian Business Owners; Ilie Şerbănescu, economic analyst.  





guessed the inflation rate right, and we were more pessimistic about the 
budget deficit than it turned out to be, in the end.  
This year, as one of the panelists told us, we started from a more reserved 
assumption, in that we are expecting hindrances on the way: the weather 
may play tricks on us, bringing damages to the agriculture and 
infrastructure; power prices may rise again, which was not carefully 
considered last year. And, having in mind this new trend among the 
commentators and entrepreneurs, one should take the figures in the table 
for a minimum threshold of economic performance, against which we 
may measure surprises as higher, rather than lower, indicators, although 
nothing can be ruled out.  
Another remarkable difference from last year was that the forecasts 
became closer and closer to the average, which is a sign that 
expectations have stabilized and the climate has become less 
unpredictable, in other words we have a more stable economy. Except 
for 2 of the 9 panelists, who are more pessimistic about the growth, the 
GDP prediction is for a1% raise against last year’s figures: somewhere 
between 4.5 and 5%. Everybody agrees, however, that the inflation rate 
will be higher than forecasted by the NBR, our average for 2006 being 
7.1%.  
With only one exception, the panelists expect a small appreciation of the 
RON to the Euro, and the exchange rate at the end of 2006 is forecasted 
to be 3.45. SAR recommendation in this respect would be to continue to 
rely on the leu for savings or investments. But, not so much in bank 
deposits, because the interest rates will continue to be low, sometimes 
lower than the inflation rate. A better choice is the capital market: the BET 
index is forecasted to have an average raise of 28%. If you choose your 
portfolio right, this figure is easily achieved.  
Finally, the gap between the budget deficit (low) and the account deficit 
(high) shows that. Just like last year, Romania’s weakness doesn’t 
necessarily lie in the governmental expenditure but, rather, in the poor 
economic performance, which cannot provide the products demanded 
by the domestic market and encourages the increased imports. However, 
the economy has become more and more diversified over the past years, 
so, perhaps, this global judgment is too narrow: there are many kinds of 
imports, and some of those bring productivity; on the other hand, a more 
efficient work and more value added on the labor unit, although desired 
and set as objectives by everybody, are sometimes blocked by policies, 
for social reasons.  
 
 
What do you anticipate would be the main economic issue the 
government will have to face in 2006? 
This open question gave more varied answers this year: the 9 panelists can 
hardly find 2-3 common ideas in this respect. The pessimistic interpretation 
of this situation could be that there are more and more economic issues 
that the government has to face. The optimistic interpretation would be 
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that one of these issues is so serious and imminent to trigger an automatic 
and unanimous answer. Depending on their line of work, each of the 
panelists sees other issues as the most important. In other words, in 
connection with what we said before, the Romanian economy becomes 
more and more diversified, although some of the imbalances still linger on. 
The answers we received suggest that the issues can be grouped on two 
categories:  
 
Emergencies / short term:  
• Balance of trade deficit, because of the rise of imports;  
• Inflationist pressures and the wide hedge between the passive and 
active interest rates; the actually negative interest rates;  
• Controlled salary increases in the public sector.  
Medium term: 
• The rise of power prices and salary increases, combined with the 
relative stability of the foreign exchange rate will lead to 
competitiveness problems for exports;  
• Economic growth slowing down because of export drops;  
• Very slow start of the large infrastructure programs, more talked about 
that implemented up to now;  
• A difficult collection of the GDP percentage to the budget, which may 
lead to a raise of the main taxes (VAT or income/corporate income 
tax).  
 
What do you think will be the most important changes brought on by the 
review of the Tax Code, programmed for January 2007, as compared to 
the current situation (February 2006)?  
As opposed to the first question, there is some convergence as to 
normative issues in the experts’ opinions: everybody agrees that the 
Government’s priority should be the increased collection of revenues to 
the state aggregated budget as a percentage of the GDP, by at least 3-
4% over the current 30%. This situation is triggered by the need to allocate 
matching funds for the pre- and post-accession programs, as well as other 
domestic policies needed in order to come in lime with the acquis 
communautaire.  
As for what will really happen, the panel members have various opinions:  
• About half of them believe that one of the large taxes will rise: they 
think it would be the VAT, although it would be possible to bring the 
flat income tax up to 18% (where it should have been placed, 
together with the corporate income tax, from the very start, just as one 
of the analysts commented, adding that the very low rate of 16% was 
not reasonable and rather considered it a blunder). Another urgent 
matter is the expansion of the tax base for the personal income tax, by 
including incomes from agriculture (and, probably, high pensions). 
Some see these measures taken until 2007 – therefore a review of the 
Tax Code this year; other believe these measures must be part of a 





long term strategy, correlated with the investment strategy, which 
should be considered for at least 2-3 years.  
• The other panelists also consider that the large taxes should be raised, 
but they don’t believe the current government will be determined 
enough to do it, at least not in 2007. It is possible, however, perhaps in 
order to balance this indecision, but not necessarily, to have  a 2006 
Tax Code review which will change some of the smaller taxes 
(property, vehicles) and introduce new ones (environment etc.). These 
taxes won’t have a major impact at the macroeconomic level, but will 
have a significant impact on the administrative sector it is envisaged 
in: e.g. by increasing the revenues o local governments.  
 
Which is the indicator/element/trend in the Romanian economy you 
believe is extremely important but not so much mentioned nowadays?  
Surprisingly enough, the answers to this questions which is the most 
general of the set, are very similar, and they converge towards two 
topics which are interconnected:  
• Structurally and on a long term, there isn’t enough talk about 
modernization, upgrading, and Romania’s poor state in this 
respect:  lack of infrastructure, energy intensive industries, 
especially in the utility sector, obsolete technologies in the 
economy in general, because of the bad industrial inheritance 
and wrong policies, which discouraged the good quality foreign 
capital to come on the market (multinational companies). All 
these elements show a picture of an energy-intensive economy, 
with low productivity rate, a poor use of the available human 
capital and, finally, low competitiveness on the foreign markets.  
• Circumstantially and on a short term, there isn’t enough talk about 
why, in an economy where consumption rates have exploded and the 
tax policies were relaxed, Romanian managers are more and more 
pessimistic and investments have slowed down.  
Moreover, another topic which is generally ignored is that of the 
absorption of EU funds in Romania, which is an indicator, on the one 
hand, of consistency in governmental policies and, on the other, of a 


















The Romanian economy: what to watch in 
2006 
 
The motion of the Romanian economy has been under the spell of two 
sets of factors lately: one, which, supposedly, fosters structural change  -- 
such factors are changes in relative prices, better governance due to the 
dissemination of best practices and privatization, etc; and another set of 
factors that refer to the policy mix and new policy arrangements. Among 
the latter I range the fiscal policy reform, a further step in the liberalization 
of the capital account, and inflation targeting (IT) as a new monetary 
policy regime. A piece of good news is that the investment grade 
obtained from Fitch and S&P’s has not been invalidated despite a very 
difficult year. Moreover, nominal convergence has been advancing as 
against new EU member countries. However, there are trends in the 
Romanian economy which should give policy-makers food for thought 
and keep them alert; a considerable slowdown in disinflation, sharply 
rising external deficits, and a drastic cut of the growth of industrial 
production are ominous. This brief does not undertake a forecast exercise, 
par excellence. Instead, it puts forward a series of issues that would likely 
impact on the Romanian economic policy and its performance in 2006; it 
also airs some views on medium term challenges.  
 
1. Supply side shocks and output dynamics 
 
Industrial output has increased substantially less in 2005 than in the 
previous year; it has risen by a likely  1.8 % while the GDP has probably 
grown by about 4.0 % for the whole of 2005 (Table 1)2. Partly, this is to 
explain by the impact of the heavy and ubiquitous rainfalls and floods of 
this year. On the other hand, it is plausible to say that Romanian industry 
and, especially, some of its sectors, have been adversely hit by a series of 
powerful shocks: the severe appreciation of the domestic currency, the 
rise in energy tariffs towards EU levels, the cut of subsidies, fiercer 
competition on internal markets,  the lifting of contingencies for European 
imports of textiles from China (while textiles are a major export item of 
Romania on EU markets). I would add here the difficulties numerous 
                                                 
2 Services and construction have increased considerably faster than industrial output 
being supported by the booming bank credit and, relatedly, a consumption binge. 





indigenous companies have in meeting the requirements of the Acquis 
communautaire (like in the field of environment protection).  
 
The rise in wages3 has also dented considerably the competitiveness of 
Romanian output. Calculations which combine the impact of the RON’s 
appreciation and the increase of wages show that the real effective 
exchange rate (the unit labor cost based REER) has gone up by more 
than 30% since November 2004.4 All this is to say that the more domestic 
market conditions match those EU wide the harder it is for numerous local 
companies to comply with the new competition terms. And this has shown 
up in less growth of output and GDP.  
 
A question comes up easily: how will domestic companies fare in the 
period to come. Or, to put it differently, has industrial output reached a 
bottom, or downward adjustment, with its related painful costs, will go on 
for a while? If the bottom has not yet been reached we may still see some 
worsening numbers in the months to come5; the consumption binge of the 
last couple of months of the year, with its influence on some industrial 
sectors and services, may have been misleading in this regard. If this is the 
case the rise of the GDP in 2006 might be even lower than in 2005 –
namely, below the estimate of cca 4%. To a further slowdown of GDP this 
year could contribute a further appreciation of the domestic currency 
and new rises in energy tariffs6. On the other hand, if its bottom has been 
reached industrial output may see its growth rise again in 2006, even if 
signs of it would likely be more visible in the second quarter. A speedier 
absorption of shocks would help the GDP growth to recover as well, which 
could also be supported by a better harvest (this year’s harvest has fallen 
by an abysmal 12% as against 20004. More infrastructure work would also 
help economic activity and the rise in the GDP.7  
 
Another note of caution is needed, nonetheless: productivity gains have 
not been impressive in 2005, which should calm down unwarranted 
optimism. And capital formation (fixed investment) has not been growing 
sufficiently in order to become a driving force for GDP growth (instead of 
consumption) –see table 18. All these uncertainties would place the 
                                                 
3 For instance, in euro terms the rise in salaries of public administration workers and other 
public sector employees has climbed by more than 40% since October 2004. 
4 In November 2004 the National Bank of Romania has made the domestic currency float 
more freely. That made the RON appreciate sharply nominally versus the euro. In the 
second half of 2005 the RON hovered around 3.6 which suggested that the NBR tried to 
avoid an “excessive” appreciation of the domestic currency. 
5 An industrial confidence index calculated by the Group of Applied Economics (GEA) for 
Q1 of 2006 shows a sobering mood among heads of Romanian companies (Bulletin no.5, 
Bucharest, February, 2006) 
6 The RON has gone up already in late February, to below 3.5. This has been prompted by 
a tightening of monetary policy (the rise in the policy rate to 8.5% from 7.5%) and resulting 
inflows of speculative capital.. 
7 The Government has announced a substantial boost of funding for infrastructure in 2006, 
but, apart from the Brasov-Bors highway, none of the other announced projects are likely 
to start in the first half of this year.  
8 Gross fixed investment can also be misleading because it does not separate investment 
in new buildings from that in new equipment and machinery; the former has registered a 
massive increase in the last few years.. 
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growth of GDP this year within the range of 3.5-4.5%, with a more likely 
outcome toward its lower end unless the harvest is substantially better 
than in 2005.  
 
Over the medium term a lot hinges on productivity gains, which, 
themselves, depend on deepening structural change (improved financial 
discipline, better management, more investment and absorption of new 
technologies, etc.). In this context it is commendable that the share of 
R&D expenditure in the public budget has gone up to 0.4% of GDP this 
year, as against 0.27% in 2005; this figure is projected to increase to 0.7% in 
2007. Companies, themselves have to invest more in R&D and the 
absorption of new technologies. 
 
Table 1: Key macroeconomic indicators 
 2003 2004 2005* 2006** 
Real GDP 
growth (%)           
5.2 8.3 4.0 3.5-4.5 
 CPI(Dec.on 
Dec, %)            
14.1 9.3 8.6 6.5-7.5 
Unemployment   7.2 6.2 6.1  
Current 
account 
 deficit, % of 
GDP                      
-6.0 -8.7 -9.2 (-9.0)-(-9.2) 
Public budget 
deficit 
-2.3 -1.1 -0.8 (-0.5)-(-1.0) 
Total saving, 
%GDP           
16.9 14.3 13.0  
Gross domestic 
investment,  % 
of GDP                  
22.9 23.1 22.2  
NBR interest 
rate(end of 
period), %   
23.4 18.8 6.7  
Reserve cover 
of imports             
3.8 4.0 5.7  
Total external 
debt             
34.1 36.3 34.5  
Sources: National bank of Romania, IMF data, and own projections 
* estimates, ** forecasts 
 
2. External deficits 
 
The trade deficit has continued to expand quite rapidly, by almost 40% as 
against 2004; it has exceeded 10 billion euro in 2005. The rapid expansion 
of bank credit and the RON’s appreciation have played a major role in 
this respect. The current account deficit went up to almost 6.8 billion euro 
in 2005, that is about 9.2% of GDP.  
 
The external deficits have been the outcome of a combination of supply 
side and demand side shocks; whereas the supply side shocks (as outlined 
in section 1 ) have slowed down industrial output the demand side factors 





(among which the booming bank credit, the flat tax and wage rises in 
particular) have driven consumption upwards.  
 
The booming credit has, arguably, been the main factor behind the rise in 
external deficits. Large credit expansion has been occurring in al 
European emerging economies in recent years. These economies are 
under-banked, profit margins are exceptional by EU standards, and EU 
accession is perceived as an anchor that boosts policy consistency and 
performance over time. These reasons are powerful enough to explain the 
upsurge of bank credit and, because of it, the growing trade and current 
account deficits. Moreover, the big share held by non-governmental 
credit in the growth of current account deficits (in Romania this share has 
gone up to almost 90% lately) cripples the traditional IMF recipe for 
dealing with external deficits9; diminishing budget deficits, or even 
achieving surpluses gets easily in the realm of inefficacy under the 
circumstances --when, in addition, there is liberalization of the capital 
account, which is a precondition of EU accession. 
 
Given that the GDP and the industrial output growth have slowed down 
significantly last year a question is begging for an answer: are such 
external deficits sustainable? As a matter of fact, there are several 
intertwined aspects related to the rise in external deficits which ask for 
clarifications. Thus, the unimpressive productivity gains of the economy, 
this year, seem to confirm the qualms I expressed, a couple of years ago, 
regarding a competitiveness challenge; more precisely: the ability of the 
economy to cope with a sharp exchange rate appreciation following the 
heavy money inflows from Romanians who work abroad and other 
capital inflows which are attracted by Romania’s prospects to join the EU 
( a sort of a Dutch disease10)11. Some would argue that the external 
deficits are not worrisome in view of the “normal” growth of bank credit 
and the presence of foreign capital in the banking industry that would, 
presumably, extend reliable long term credit lines to their Romanian 
outfits. But such arguments have their own limits; in the real economy 
there is no one way street; painful corrections are inevitable at one point 
in time were deficits to exceed certain thresholds12.  
 
Were such a correction to happen, it would involve a severe depreciation 
of the exchange rate that could rekindle inflation and put some non-
                                                 
9 This a lesson amply illustrated by the crisis in South East Asia in the second half of the last 
decade. 
10 The Dutch disease refers to a bonanza  which bestows a country; this bonanza, entailed 
by rapidly expanding exports of natural resources (oil, or gas) would lead to an excessive 
appreciation of the domestic currency that would hurt manufacturing exports 
considerably. 
11 Daianu, “Are we threatened by a Dutch disease?”, Ziarul Financiar, June, .2004. See also 
D.Daianu and Ella Kallai, “Disinflation and monetary policy arrangements in Romania”, 
William Davidson Institute Working Paper, November 2004 and in K.Liebscher et.al (ed.), 
“European Economic Integration and South East Europe”, Cheltenham (UK), Edward Elgar, 
2005, pp.135 
12 For the current account such a threshold may be around 9% in view of current and 
anticipated stable capital inflows (including FDI). But such thresholds are more theoretical, 
for they can change as conditions do.  
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negligible strain on bank balance-sheets. And keep in mind that 
disinflation is not yet solid enough. Hopefully, investment would pick up 
and new technologies would bolster the competitiveness of our firms. 
Since the vulnerability indicators of the Romanian economy (table 2) are 
in a good shape a worse case scenario would more likely occur over the 
medium term. But even then, an implosion in the banking sector is hard to 
contemplate now. 
 
Although vulnerability indicators seem to preclude a short term accident 
this is no reason for complacency. Policies have to stay prudent in 2006 
and in the following year. What has to be watched carefully here is the 
effectiveness of tight budget and monetary policies when bank credit is 
rising so rapidly. As I have stressed already, betting on budget policy to 
control external deficits is devoid of much sense when the capital 
account is free and bank credit extinguishes any significant crowding out 
effect. But this does not mean that budget policy has the leeway to be 
relaxed. There is an asymmetric policy efficacy at work here. The budget 
deficit in 2006 is also presented within a range (-0.5, -1.0) as its current 
construction is questionable (some revenues are overestimated and some 
expenditure underestimated). 
 
Needed policy corrections at one point in time may prove to be quite 
painful under such circumstances. Hopefully, the expansion of bank credit 
would relent in the not too distant future and help the NBR and the 
Government to avoid measures that could provoke a recession as a 
means to correct unsustainable balance of payments imbalances. 
 
Table 2: Vulnerability indicators 
 
 2003 2004 2005* 
Total external debt 
% of GDP     
34.1 36.3 34.5 
Public sector debt, 
% GDP 
24.4 23.7 19.0 
Official reserves/ 
broad money/M2   
45.0 53.0 65.0 
Total short term 
external debt,  
% of GDP 
7.0 8.8 8.1 




3. Disinflation, wage policy and public finance 
 
After remarkable progress during the last few years disinflation has 
advanced pretty little in 2005: the end of the year inflation rate has gone 
down to 8.6% from 9.3% in 2004. Although disinflation has stayed the 
course in 2005 strong pro-cyclical pressures have put it under jeopardy; 
the flat tax and high wage rises have increased revenues available to 
both individuals and firms at a time when internal demand was driving the 
economy. And the Central Bank, for the sake of discouraging hot money, 





has brought down interest rates sharply, a move that has entailed its own 
risks in terms of discouraging saving and boosting consumption (table 1). 
Bank deposit rates have become negative in real terms in 2005. It goes 
without saying that the rise in administered energy prices and speeded up 
higher excises have played also a major role in slowing down disinflation. 
 
The inflation target was revised twice in 2005: once after the introduction 
of the 16% flat tax (from 6% as it was stated in the National Development 
Program (NDP), to 7%), which increased available income to consumers 
and firms; the second time, in August 2005, from 7% to 7,5%, when the 
shocks mentioned above moved the revised target beyond reach. The 
spread of 1.1% above the 7.5 revised inflation target is quite irrelevant for it 
covers only four months; were it annualized it would be much higher. 
 
The NBR has faced major trade-offs in the last couple of years; one is the 
attempt to fend off major speculative inflows (which are attracted by 
interest rate differentials and the appreciation of the domestic currency) 
with the need to maintain a prudent policy stance in view of the booming 
consumption. Another trade-off has been the use of exchange rate 
appreciation as a tool to enhance disinflation vs. the danger of eroding 
the competitiveness of Romanian production. The Ministry of Finance, too, 
has been facing major dilemmas; an important one is running low budget 
deficits (which should support disinflation) while a rise in infrastructure and 
education expenditure is badly needed; this trade-off has been 
compounded by the effects of the flat tax. These dilemmas and trade-offs 
will accompany policy in the years to come as well. 
 
For inflation targeting, as the new monetary policy regime of the National 
Bank (NBR), the real test would be this year. The last four months of 2005, 
during which IT has been initiated, are not conclusive. Arguably, it would 
have been better to postpone its introduction because of the 
unfavorable features of the domestic monetary transmission mechanism 
and a series of rises in administered prices13. The test of this year will 
continue to be highly demanding since monetary conditions remain 
peculiar: almost half of the money supply escapes NBR’s control because 
of euro and dollar denominated transactions; interest rate differentials are 
still high; the boom of bank credit and capital account liberalization have 
eroded NBR’s ability to control the money supply. As  a matter of fact the 
Central Bank is compelled by these circumstances to pursue, sotto voce, 
other objectives as well, aside from the main mission of bringing inflation 
down. 
 
The 5% inflation target for 2006 is, practically, unreachable and markets 
know it. One might say that such a target would help the Government 
fend off new wage demands and send a strong message about the 
determination of NBR to stand firm on disinflation; and that disinflation 
                                                 
13 For an analysis of the circumstances under which IT is practiced in Romania see Daianu 
and Kallai (2004 and 2005). See also Daianu, Laurian Lungu and Radu Vranceanu, 
“Romania’s Monetary Institutions and policy: Meeting the EU Challenge”, Bucharest, 
Romanian European Institute, 2004.   
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expectations would not demur if the 5% target is stuck to. But, there are 
counterarguments to adopting an over-ambitious inflation target. If this 
target is hardly credible markets would not buy it and other forecasts 
(made by commercial banks and IFIs, etc) are likely to be factored in by 
the corporate world, which would impact on real prices. As a matter of 
fact, the very February inflation report of the NBR suggests that the 
inflation for 2006 would likely come close to 6.6%, in the basic scenario14. 
This observation, practically, weakens the dis-inflationary power of the 5% 
inflation target for this year, for it does make sense to individuals and 
companies to go for the 6.6% number when considering the NBR’s 
forecasts. Likewise, missing the inflation target again (after 2005), by a 
large margin, would not help bolster the Central Bank’s credibility.  
 
An additional key issue is the stance of monetary policy in order to support 
an over-ambitious target; unless monetary policy, together with budget 
and wage policies are very tight a 5% inflation target is hardly credible. It 
can be submitted that a questionable budget deficit target and interest 
rates which are also geared to discouraging speculative capital inflows 
would not signal a sufficiently tight policy stance15. The mentioning of a 
probable 6.6% inflation rate at the end of the year does not help either in 
this regard. 
 
The bottom line is that the Central Bank has acknowledged a likely 
substantial spread over the inflation target in 2006. But it hopes to come 
close to its target of 4% in 2007. However, the NBR should consider the 
complicated nature of the accession year, when higher budget 
expenditure is going to take place. Even if budget policy would involve 
some crowding out of private expenditure (via larger tax income) a 
higher overall public budget expenditure would be quite probable owing 
to EU funds and the use of privatization receipts for infrastructure works. 
And more public budget expenditure would raise aggregate demand 
which, unless met by adequate domestic production, would harm 
disinflation and lead, ceteris paribus, to higher external deficits as well. 
Moreover, the intensity of crowding out is questionable when there is 
almost total capital account liberalization and credit is readily available. 
The Balassa-Samuelson effect would also impede bringing inflation down 
to cca. 4% in 2007. For these reasons the NBR has to be cautious of pinning 
all hopes on a low inflation in 2007 at the expense of missing the target 
considerably this year; it may turn out that missing the inflation target by a 
large margin would occur three years in row. And that would not 
enhance credibility. If early elections happen in 2007 they would also 
complicate the mission of the NBR to pursue a low inflation target in that 
year. 
 
                                                 
14 “Report on Inflation”, NBR, Bucharest, February. 2006, pp.42 
15 A higher level of the policy interest rate is not necessarily an optimal signal of policy 
tightening when there is a substantial discrepancy between the NBR’s policy and 
intervention rates; in this case the intervention rate of the NBR would be a better indicator. 
For instance, the NBR has moved up its policy rate, to 8.5%, in February this year. What 
matters, however, in the end is the rate at which the NBR would consistently soak up 
liquidity from the market.   





An optimal revision of inflation targets should have taken place across the 
2005-2007 period in view of the shocks of last year. I would highlight again 
the wording of NBR’s February report since it says unambiguously that the 
likelihood for inflation to be around 6.6%, in the basic scenario for 2006, is 
significant. As a matter of fact the Central Bank confirms what markets 
predict already to be more likely to occur this year. Unintended or not, it 
appears that a de facto revision of the inflation target for 2006 has 
occurred. And sooner or later the NBR would have to consider a revision 




For disinflation the control of wages is essential. There are two the aspects 
involved here: one is the advance of wages when these are not related 
to productivity gains and, consequently, exert inflationary pressures. As 
the graphic below shows the annual increase of the net average salary 
has stayed at a high level during the last few years although inflation has 
been coming down remarkably. 16The slowing down of industrial output 
suggests that this rise in salaries must have exceeded the labour 
productivity gains. Consequently, inflationary pressures operate on the 
side of salaries. Another aspect is  wage indexation, which may worsen 
inflation expectations. Preferably, indexation should occur only once a 
year. The NBR is right to emphasize this issue for the success of disinflation.   
 
 









Jan-02 Jun-02 Nov-02 Apr-03 Sep-03 Feb-04 Jul-04 Dec-04 May-05 Oct-05
Annual Change (%) 
Average Nominal Net Wage Inflation
 
Source: Laurian Lungu       
 
                                                 
16 The rise in the real net salary was 4.7% in 2002, 10.1% in 2003, 10.6% in 2004 and 14.7% in 
the first 11 months of 2005.  (Laurian Lungu, “Inflation Targeting: record and prospects”, 
Ziarul Financiar, 13 February, 2006 
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The public budget 
 
The execution of the public budget has ended with a 0.8% deficit in 2005 
(table 3). The low deficit is due primarily to a sharp rise in VAT and excise 
revenues, which has been brought about by higher consumption and 
imports. A budget rectification in early 2005, that has involved, 
unfortunately, a severe curtailment of capital expenditure, is to be 
mentioned in this regard as well (capital expenditure has gone down from 
3.3% of GDP in 2004 to 2.8% in 2005 –table 3).  
 
Table 3: The consolidated public budget (% GDP) 
 
 2003 2004 2005* 
Total revenue and 
grants 
29.8 29.6 29.4 
Tax                                 28.2 27.9 27.8 
- Profits   2.3 2.7 2.6 
- personal income 2.8 3.0 2.1 
- VAT 7.2 6.9 7.9 
Expenditure                  32.1 30.7 30.2 
- wages/salaries 4.8 4.9 5.6 
- subsidies/transfers      14.1 14.0 13.7 
- capital   3.5 3.3 2.8 




-2.3 -1.1 -0.8 
     Sources: official statistics and IMF data; * preliminary  
 
 
Though the public budget presumes a deficit of -0.5% for 2006 some of its 
underlying premises are questionable; I am referring to GDP growth and 
inflation, some envisaged expenditure (rises in salaries that are not yet 
budgeted), an anticipated rise in VAT revenues in particular. Therefore, a 
budget rectification would have to consider a revision of these premises.  
 
Budget execution has to remain tight in 2007 in order to support 
disinflation. Nevertheless, the financing of infrastructure projects has to be 
increased. And special attention has to be given to raising the capacity 
to absorb EU funds. As mentioned above, the 2007 public budget would 
undergo a “shock” on both the revenue and the expenditure sides when 
EU funds and their co-financing are included. Privatization receipts (which 
would make up a so called National Development Fund) would add to 
available higher public budget funds.  
 
The payment of the contribution to the EU budget and co-financing of EU 
funds would involve 2-2.5% of additional budget funds; in order to avoid a 
significant rise in the public budget better tax collection and a 
broadening of the tax base would be more then welcome; as some 
suggest, a rise of some taxes would be unavoidable in the period to come 





in order to keep the budget deficit below -1.5% of GDP in the accession 
year17. 
 
The “macroeconomics of a higher budget” is a key policy topic for the 
Government and the Central Bank; unless properly designed and 
programmed higher budget expenditure can re-inflame inflation and 
lead to higher external deficits. The composition of budget expenditure 
would matter tremendously in this regard. For it is one thing to spend more 
money for higher wages; and it is quite different if the funds are used to 
build up infrastructure and better education, as well as for the reform of 
the pension system. The more the public budget crowds in domestic 
production the better. For this to happen public money has to be spent 
on infrastructure wisely. 
 
                                                     
4. EU commitments 
 
Romania has to make better on its commitments to the EU. Likewise, 
Romanian elites have to define national interests better, in concrete 
terms, which should be pursued before and after accession. Privatization 
and the regulation of public utilities are to be mentioned in this respect. 
The decision not to privatize Romgaz with a strategic investor is quite 
appropriate. Likewise, the regulation of privatized utilities has to be more 
effective and prevent abuse of market power. Whereas the pricing in 
domestic markets of oil and gas products should force Romanian 
companies to become competitive (according to the rules of the game 
in the EU) a much less compelling argument can be used about the price 
level when it comes to household consumers. In a country where many 
individuals can hardly make ends meet financially and there is domestic 
production of oil, gas and hydropower, a EU level pricing of energy for 
households is questionable, economically, socially and politically; a 
gradual rise in prices (that should go beyond the accession year, in pace 
with the rise in average incomes) makes sense. 
 
The EU has its specific supranational interests; but it is also a constellation 
of national interests which, often, are conflicting. And this reality poses 
numerous challenges to national decision making. 
 
 
5. The international milieu 
 
The international environment would  continue to be influenced by major 
uncertainties which are rooted in global imbalances and the economic 
fallout from geopolitical conflicts.  
 
Economic stagnation in Europe and elsewhere, as well as the rise of 
China, India and other Asian economies, would prompt countries 
                                                 
17 If such a rise occurs and it involves an increase of the VAT (instead of the flat tax) that 
would deliver a heavy blow to NBR’s objective of bringing inflation down to below 5% in 
2007. While a rise in the flat tax would be an embarrassment to the Government.  
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(including the EU and its individual member countries) to seek more 
protectionism as a means to defend domestic markets (The grid-locked 
Doha trade round speaks for itself).  
 
The price of basic commodities (oil and gas, in particular) would continue 
to be under the pressure of the rise of Asian economies and supply side 
bottlenecks. These circumstances would affect the Romanian economy. 
 
 
6. Summing up and a few policy guidelines 
 
a. The slowdown of output, as an outcome of supply side shocks, should 
be a matter of serious concern. The months to come would illuminate if 
this is a short-term adjustment phenomenon, or longer term effects are at 
work. An in depth analysis of how changes in relative prices and other 
shocks have affected industrial sectors and companies is badly needed. 
This analysis would help both policy making and heads of companies. For 
the growth of output to pick up again it is essential that fixed investment 
rise steadily and new technology absorption is intense. Much is in the 
hands of the private sector since it produces almost 70% of GDP.  
 
b. Productivity gains have been subsiding lately and the slowdown in the 
growth of exports18 indicates that the appreciation of the RON and high 
wage rises are taking their toll. If this appreciation would continue as and 
after Romania gets into the EU, and efficiency gains are not adequate, a 
major competitiveness problem might develop --as a sort of a Dutch 
disease. Local firms have to respond to this challenge by cutting 
redundant costs, by absorbing new technology, by mergers and fusions 
that create synergies and enhance capabilities. Industrial relocation (from 
West to East) could help the Romanian economy, but there is no 
implacable engine at work here. Low wages are far from supplying the 
critical ingredient when competition is increasingly global.   
 
c. Supply side shocks and bank credit driven consumption, plus the wealth 
effect due to the RON’s appreciation, have led to higher external deficits 
in 2005. This tendency can not continue for long were FDI inflows and 
efficiency gains insufficient. The Government and the NBR have to be on 
alert on this tendency. Monetary and budget policies have to stay tight 
while the composition of budget expenditure has to focus on capital 
goods (infrastructure) and education. It is commendable that the share of 
R&D in the public budget has gone up to 0.4% of GDP (from 0.27% in 
2005); companies themselves have to invest more in new technologies.  
 
d. Budget and monetary policies have to stay tight in order to continue 
disinflation and contain the rise in external deficits. Monetary policy needs 
to be more consistent while the budget policy should focus on crowding 
in domestic production --via infrastructure development and better 
                                                 
18 Some exports have a heavy lohn content. In a way, such lohn-based exports inflate the 
volume of exports and imports. They can disappear as sudden as they appear. 





education. Wage control is a critical factor in going on with disinflation in 
view of the record of subsiding productivity gains in recent years.  
 
e. Inflation targeting has been started  under unfavorable domestic 
monetary conditions, that complicate its conduct and hang to inflation a 
cluster of adjacent objectives (avoid exchange rate over-appreciation, 
encouraging credit in domestic currency, etc). Therefore, monetary policy 
would continue to face major trade-offs 
 
f. Impediments for monetary policy are also entailed by the 
“macroeconomics of a higher budget” in the accession and subsequent 
years. In order to avert/mitigate a  “budget shock” in the accession and 
subsequent years there is need for better tax collection and a broadening 
of the tax base; a rise in some taxes might be inevitable in order to keep 
the budget deficit below –1.5% in the accession year. 
 
h. Infrastructure is revealing itself as a development bottleneck. Together 
with education it can propel development. There are substantial EU funds 
and privatization receipts to this end, but these resources need to be 
capitalized by good projects and good practices. The Government has 
announced that the Bucharest-Brasov highway would be financed by the 
public budget in order to avoid delays. However, since this route benefits 
on a high traffic it would be sensible to see whether private-public 
partnerships can be used in order to save public money for projects that 
can scarcely use private finance without state guarantees. 
 
i. The logistics of the EU funds utilization is a formidable challenge for the 
Romanian government. Time is running out and too little has been done in 
terms of finding ways to circumvent the antiquated and impervious to 
change system. Hiring new people and a better pay is insufficient under 
the circumstances. 2007-2013 is, probably, the period with the largest EU 
budget funding potentially available to Romania. The Lisbon Agenda 
constraints plus the tensions between donor and recipients countries 
would likely reduce the funding after 2014. Unless Romania proves that it 
can absorb EU funds adequately longer term prospects for financial 





     
 




         JUSTICE 
 
 
Reform shakes conservative establishment 
 
 
2005 was an important year for the judicial reform in Romania. In March 
2005 the new Government adopted an ambitious revised Strategy and 
Action Plan 2005-2007 to reform the justice system. Unlike previous 
strategies which dealt with broader institutional aspects, these documents 
were aimed at the judicial process itself, so they represent a significant 
step forward. These enhanced efforts aimed at completing judicial reform 
came as the combined result of two key factors. Firstly, the change in 
government in November 2004 produced a centre-right, reformist 
government, which included a Minister of Justice who had previously 
worked as a civil society activist and human rights lawyer for the Council 
of Europe. Secondly, the introduction of a safeguard clause regarding EU 
accession at the December 2004 European Council provided serious 
impetus, as reform of the judiciary came on top of the EU list. Failure to 
achieve standards in this area can attract a delay of the accession date 
from 2007 to 2008. The new legislation, the implementation of the old and 
more generally the whole reform met with tremendous opposition, 
highlighting the main problem of the Romanian transition: conservatives 
seem often to outnumber reformists.  
 
The reform package passed in 2004 stripped the Ministry of Justice of 
many of its powers in order to entrust them to the elected body Superior 
Council of Magistrates (SCM). The Council was elected last December 
after an election in which heads of Courts were often the only candidates 
to run. The result was not an accountability body, but a representative 
body for the top management of the judiciary as it has been for the last 
decades. It was entrusted with full control over the recruitment, promotion 
and control of judges.  
 
This body did not delay in positioning itself more like a defender of 
corporate interests than as a reformer and controller of the judiciary. 
Members insisted in keeping their double capacity as heads of Courts and 
controllers of the same Courts. They denied the mere existence of 
corruption within the judiciary and hired most of their staff from the Ministry 
of Justice. Tenths of employees of the Ministry, precisely those who had 





been accused for years to have delayed reforms, followed the transfer of 
power from the Ministry to the Council and considerable delays were 
incurred on long discussed reforms, such as introducing clear standards for 
the evaluation and promotion of judges. 
 
Following consultation with stakeholders a revision of the 2004 so-called 
three-law package on justice reform (Laws on the Superior Council of the 
Magistracy, on the Organization of the Judiciary and on the Statute of 
Magistrates) was submitted by the Government to Parliament in June 2005 
and adopted after a vote of confidence. The 2004 laws have been 
criticized by Freedom House in the Nations in Transit 2005 country report 
for failing to provide an accountability mechanism for the newly 
empowered Superior Council of Magistrates and for the General Attorney 
office. In early July the Constitutional Court issued a majority ruling that 4 
articles were unconstitutional. These were important articles. One 
provided that judges must retire at the same legal age with all 
employees, in an effort to open the system to younger magistrates. 
Despite not touching in any way on the Constitution the article fell, as it 
would have pushed into retirement the families of judges of the 
Constitutional Court as well. The Court also opposed that heads of Courts, 
appointed by the Minister of Justice under SDP are dismissed and open 
competition is held for these offices, allowing only for such competitions 
when the office became vacant. The strangest ruling was on the 
incompatibility of a position as SCM member, which was agreed it should 
become a permanent position, to another management position in the 
judiciary. The Court ruled that this exists only for the President and the vice-
president of the SCM, leaving the rest of the members free to hold both 
offices. Pressure on some of them to solve this conflict of interest 
eventually led to the resignation of the SCM President and his 
replacement. 
 
The disputed articles were subsequently revised and the package was 
promulgated in mid-July. The package retained many positive elements, 
and the legal framework now offers sufficient guarantees for magistrates’ 
personal and institutional independence, although accountability 
mechanisms are still frail. The package puts individual and managerial 
accountability at the centre of the system and diminishes the power of 
the heads of Courts to hand cases to selected judges, a major source of 
corruption and influence traffic in the past. The revised legislation states 
that Chief Prosecutors can only allocate cases to prosecutors on the basis 
of clear and objective criteria such as workload and specialization and 
can no longer intervene in the activity of prosecutors subordinated to 
them.  
 
The Civil and Criminal Procedure Codes were also amended in 2005 in an 
attempt of simplifying and speeding up the lengthy and complicated 
judicial procedures.19 A new Ethics Code for Magistrates was drafted by 
                                                 
19 The Criminal Procedure Code was not passed by the Parliament yet. 
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the Ministry of Justice together with the Superior Council of Magistrates in 
September. This code provided for the first time in a Romanian law that 
judges and prosecutors must not have cooperated with the former 
Securitate and must not be currently working for any intelligence 
agency.20 
 
2005 also registered the first significant budgetary increase for the 
judiciary (56 million EUR, representing an approximately 20% increase 
following two budgetary rectifications). The 2006 budget (403 million EUR) 
provides for further increase of approximately 12% (41 million EUR) for the 
overall budget of the judiciary, as compared to the 2005 rectified budget 
(362 million EUR). This ensures the financial resources for the 
implementation of the ambitious Reform Strategy adopted in 2005. 
 
The most serious problem in the reform of the judiciary remains the 
conservatism of the High Courts, which assemble, due to seniority 
requirements, mostly aged former Communist judges. The Constitutional 
Court has for more than half of its members’ magistrates with a previous 
social-democratic affiliation, from ministers to advisors, although the Court 
is supposed to be apolitical. SCM members have six years appointments, 
while members of Superior Courts have life tenure. Despite efforts from the 
government side, implementation of reforms is bound to remain a 
challenge.  
 
Anticorruption pushed despite political opposition 
 
Romania in 2005 enjoyed a cleaner central government, and better 
anticorruption plans and laws were passed. But each concrete step was 
fought fiercely between reformers and conservatives and so the progress 
achieved was smaller than popular expectations. 
 
The Freedom House audit of the anticorruption strategy provided a basis 
for the new action plan against corruption. The audit was organized at 
the request of the December 2004 European Council and published in 
March 2005. The first immediate practical consequence of an audit 
showing how irrelevant the activity of the National Anticorruption 
Prosecutor (NAP) had been in the previous years (this special office 
created to fight grand corruption had succeeded in more than two years 
to prosecute only a political advisor and an assistant magistrate as top 
people) would have been the dismissal of the head of this agency. The 
man had close links with SDP, having his own brother as a MP of this party. 
                                                 
20 Before appointing a magistrate, the SCM has the obligation to check with CNSAS (the 
Council for the Study of the Former Securitate Files) if the respective magistrate had ever 
cooperated with the former Securitate. At the same time, upon appointment, the 
magistrate has to sign a declaration stating that he is not working for any intelligence 
agency.  





However, his dismissal had to wait until the judicial reform package was 
passed by the Parliament, as the passage introduced a mechanism of 
holding accountable the two major Prosecutors, the General Prosecutor 
of Romania and the National Anticorruption Prosecutor. Amazingly 
enough, the package on the judicial reform of 2004, although supervised 
by a plethora of experts, had missed entirely to create such an 
accountability mechanism. SDP fought fiercely to defend the 
Anticorruption Prosecutor, voted against the judicial reform and used all 
its influence in the Superior Courts to halt the reform. When a NAP 
prosecutor finally summoned enough courage to investigate the scandal 
of SDP transcripts (as they recorded interventions to shield political friends 
from anticorruption prosecution), the Constitutional Court expediently 
ruled that the NAP was not even allowed to investigate MPs, although it 
had been created two years in advance with precisely the purpose of 
dealing with top level corruption. NAP was then turned into a Department 
within the General Prosecutor’s Office (NAD), so to bring again top 
politicians under its lawful authority. In March 2006, however, this revision, 
previously passed by government as an emergency ordinance, so taking 
immediate effect, came for parliamentary approval and was stalled. It 
needed an intervention by the President of Romania who negotiated with 
the parties to push the ordinance through Parliament. An effective NAD 
clearly makes many MPs feel very uncomfortable. It kept NAP has been 
the beneficiary of considerable investment, and unlike ordinary 
prosecution offices it has the judiciary police under its direct control. The 
competences of the new NAD have been narrowed to only the highest 
corruption cases where the bride is over EUR 10 000 or the material 
damage exceeds EUR 200 000. The NAD will also be responsible for 
investigating certain customs-related offences and tax evasion where the 
damage exceeds EUR 1 million as well as offences against the European 
Union’s financial interests. A new NAD head was eventually appointed 
after the whole management was sacked or left in August. But months of 
anticorruption were lost simply fighting to empower this office to do its job.  
 
The new appointed head, a young prosecutor, Daniel Morar, has 
embarked in a reshuffling of NAD’s operations. Between January 1st and 
December 31st, 200521, NAD charged 744 defendants among which a 
former MP, 4 magistrates, 6 lawyers, 38 employees in law enforcement 
agencies, 8 high level employees in the central administration, 17 officials 
and high level employees in the county and local administration. An 
important businessman and liberal politician, Dinu Patriciu, with close ties 
to the Prime Minister, is also investigated, as well as the former Prime 
Minister Adrian Nastase.  Mr. Nastase is a collateral, although not 
innocent, victim of the compulsory statements of wealth. He was always 
on the public payroll (a minister in Romania has been paid an average of 
about 500 euros throughout transition(\) and has difficulties in explaining 
how he amassed millions of euros. Courts sentenced 325 defendants 
between January 1st and December 31st, 2005, including one magistrate, 
34 employees in law enforcement agencies, 16 custom employees, 5 
                                                 
21 Since the establishment of NAPO until December 31, 2005, NAPO indicted 1809 
defendants. 
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officials in county or local administration and 6 bank directors. NAD 
investigates members of Parliament, other high level dignitaries, 
magistrates, police officials, customs officials, mayors and local barons. 
  
Overall, there has been an increase in the political will to tackle 
corruption. The Minister of Justice, Monica Macovei, as well as some new 
offices, such as the Office for Money Laundering and the Office for Fiscal 
Evasion showed real commitment to fighting corruption. The Office of 
Money Laundering even opened an investigation on the PM’s bank 
accounts, a step showing that these offices are de facto independent. 
Other measures designed to fight high-level corruption entered into force 
in 2005 and early 2006, including the removal of the de facto immunity of 
former Ministers in April 2005 and the adoption of new templates for 
wealth statements in May 2005. These statements are public and posted 
on the Internet sites of government agencies. A project to create a 
national integrity agency which would check the validity of these 
statements and enforce conflict of interest regulations is under work. In 
April 2005 Romania abolished also the criminal immunity of public notaries 
and bailiffs. 
 
The Freedom House audit criticized the lack of coordination of the many 
bodies fighting corruption. In one of its most spectacular findings, the 
audit showed that control agencies such as Financial Guard or Audit 
Court have sent less that 10 cases to NAP for further investigation since its 
creation in 2003, and those did not lead to any prosecutions. Despite 
more political will to increase coordination in 2005, it has not happened 
yet. Ministries continued to compete among themselves to create 
anticorruption offices or host the future Agency for Public Integrity. The 
most ambitious project belongs to the mammoth Ministry of Internal Affairs 
and Administration (MAI), which pushed a bill through Parliament in May 
2005 on the creation of its new anti-corruption structure within the Ministry, 
called the Directorate General for Anti-Corruption (DGA), which will 
control the staff working in central and regional structures, notably the 
police, border police and gendarmerie. Critics allege that the structure is 
based too much on the secret service staff of this ministry, people with 
roots in the former Securitate of Ceausescu, but everybody agrees 
corruption within law and order agencies needs special tackling.  
 
A 2005 EBRD-World Bank survey (BEEPS) of businesses in South-Eastern 
Europe found that Romania made significant progress from 200222. Bribing 
is down, and costs of registering and operating businesses have 
decreased considerably. Romania is under the current East Central 
European average on bribes as a share of annual sales, after scoring 
nearly the double of European average in 2002. The trend is clearly 
positive. 
 
                                                 
22 See report at 
http://siteresources.worldbank.org/INTECAREGTOPANTCOR/Resources/BEEPS2005-at-a-
glance-Final-Romania.pdf  










ADMINISTRATIVE TRANSPARENCY INCREASES 
SIGNIFICANTLY 
DISCIPLINARY MECHANISMS, HOWEVER, LAG BEHIND 
 
 
The mass of taxpayers can control those who govern and manage their 
country in two ways. First and foremost, we have the elections, if they are 
free and fair, as they provide a vertical control. Those who cannot govern 
well are bound to lose the elections. However, in developed countries, the 
change of governments brings on some changes of policies, but not of 
the overall government style, of governance, as it were. There are a 
number of reasons why this change doesn’t happen: 1) the government 
has accurate performances, but the people are dissatisfied because of 
some political, social or economic matter (inflation rate, unemployment 
etc.); 2) the politicians in various parties come form the same social layer, 
which may have different ideologies, but not different philosophies about 
the way the state should function; and 3) most of the administrative 
activities are run by the professional civil servants, the bureaucrats, who 
do not change with every election cycle, no matter what party accedes 
to power. This is why vertical control is, sometimes, not very satisfactory. In 
substantial democracies it is also corroborated with a horizontal control, 
exercised by the courts of law, anti-corruption agencies, the disciplinary 
commissions of the Parliament of Government, the media, civil society.  
 
In such societies as Romania, where a whole process of rebuilding is in 
progress, after the communist era, there is a risk that some of the 
institutions won’t work at the same time, that there are no effective 
election committees, the courts do not issue accurate and timely rulings, 
there are no managers with lots of experience to secure the good 
functioning of the state irrespective of political problems. The 
administration reform in such countries has been rightfully compared to 
the building of a ship, which is already floating and started on at full 
speed. The public transparency laws in this case, like the free access to 
public information and transparency in decision-making laws in Romania 
also have another purpose than that of democratizing Romanian 
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administration, namely the very practical purpose of making any citizen or 
private entity with access to information about the governance a willing 
and volunteer instrument of controlling the administration, when all other 
controls seem to fail. This is why we need mandatory wealth statements, 
open to the public, not only to state agencies, because we relay on the 
public to exercise this control, in an age of immaturity of the state.  
 
The Romanian Academic Society has proposed a number of controls to 
be exercised in this respect, mainly articles in laws and official regulations, 
which have been adopted. In 2002, one year after the FOIA Law 544/2001 
should have started to be implemented, SAR conducted a wide survey in 
the public sector, to see the way this implementation was going. In 2006, 
the final year before EU integration, if no accidents happen on the way, 
SAR repeated and expanded this research23, in order to see the way 
administration evolved over the past 3 years. We monitored the 
implementation of the transparency laws, among which some of the 
provisions which were introduced in the law texts upon SAR’s initiative, 
especially the mandatory annual activity report to be issued by each 
public institution, to be used as an instrument of controlling the use of 
public funds. The results of this survey should be seen as a test of the 
implementation capacity of our administration, as a measure of its 
maturity. The extent to which EU funds have been spent and this survey 
can be considered a diagnosis of the administrative capacities in 
Romania.  
 
This annual report on governance will not discus political problems, whose 
impact on accession is indirect or very weak (anybody who is ruling would 
have the same problems), but the structural issue of the state maturity and 
capacity. We  made a survey of 500 public institutions in order to get 
these results. The detailed structure of the sample is presented in figure 1.  
 
Figure 1. Surveyed Institutions  
Type  No.  
City Halls  85 
County Councils  42 
Prefect’s Offices  42 
School Inspectorates  42 
Employment Offices  42 
Labor and Social Solidarity Departments  12 
Police Inspectorates  42 
Town police sections  6 
Prosecutor’s Offices with District Courts  40 
                                                 
23 The method used in this survey was that of the face-to-face questionnaire applied to the 
individuals in charge of implementing Law 544/2001. The sample was made up of 500 
public institutions, and the valid no. of questionnaires was 453. We selected 96 cities, of 
which 40 county seats, and the criteria for sampling institutions were: development region, 
county seats, second largest city in the region after the county seat, two communities with 
more than 30,000 inhabitants, and towns under 30,000 inhabitants. 
 





Prosecutor’s Offices with Appeal Courts  6 
Regional Customs Offices  10 
Appeal Courts  16 
Health Insurance Houses  42 
Financial Guard  42 
Ministries  15 
Governmental Agencies  13 
SMC  1 
Parliament (Senate and Chamber) 2 
Total 500 
 
The results of this survey seem pleasing (see Figure 2). The Implementation 
of the FOIA Law has progressed a lot, and now almost each public 
institution in most county seats has a civil servant in charge if 
implementing this law. The number of requests for information based on 
this law exploded once the law became more and more known. 
Administrative of legal complaints increased several times, when the 
request for information is denied. Unfortunately, very few of these 
complaints seem to be solved administratively, therefore the number of 
suits against the administration also rose. Secrecy is not the only invoked 
reason for denying the request, most of the time it is a matter of 
administrative issues. More than 2/3 of the surveyed institutions now have 
a list of information ex officio, as compared to the 16% in the first year 
after the law came in force. The deconcentrated offices of the Ministry of 
Labor and the Prefect’s Offices rank first among the institutions with lists of  
ex officio information (Figure 3). The opposite ranking belongs to the 
Prosecutor’s offices and town halls. Only 2/3 of the ministries have such a 
list, although the law should be implemented 100% in the central 
administration. The residential environment also brings on significant 
differences, with a higher implementation rate in Bucharest (77%), a good 
rate in county seats (74%), and a considerable lower one in small towns 
(62%).  
 
Figure 2. Main Developments 2003-2006  
 2002 % 2006 % Trend 
Percentage of hired FOIA officers (in charge 
of implementing Law 544)  
75 97 Very positive 
Requests for information received  22 82 Very positive 
Administrative complaints  4 12 Positive 
Complaints in court  1.6 10 Positive 
Percentage of ex officio information lists 
available for immediate submittal  
16 73 Very positive 
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Figure 3. Existence of the List of Information Ex Officio according to the 
types of institutions  
 
Institution Percentage of implementation  
City Halls 71 
County Councils 87 
Prefect’s Offices 90 
Prosecutor’s Offices with District Courts 60 
School Inspectorates 68 
Police Inspectorates 73 
Employment Offices 80 
Financial Guard 63 
Health Insurance Houses 76 
Prosecutor’s Offices with Appeal Courts 50 
Appeal Courts 83 
Labor and Social Solidarity Departments 64 
Regional Customs Offices 80 
District Courts 78 
Ministries 64 
Governmental Agencies 78 
 
 
Even for the more qualitatively challenging requests provided by the law, 
as, for instance, the issue of a public activity report of the institution, the 
progress is important, although of poor quality. There are no standards for 
this report, so that, in some cases, the reports of the pres desks regarding 
communication and not the activities of the whole institution have been 
presented as activity reports. The methodological annexes of Law 544 
provided very brief standards, which are not implemented. Usually, these 
reports don’t include the goals and don’t make any connection between 
the implemented activities and the expenditures. As a positive aspect we 
should note the posting of such reports on the websites, especially in 
Bucharest, but the current situation of using the report as an instrument of 
control is highly problematic. Only half of the institutions which claimed 
they produced such a report were able to show it to our operators, and 
the same percentage of institutions organized public annual presentations 
of their activities, where the report was also presented. In this respect, the 
situation is  better in county seats (49% made such activity reports public), 
as compared to Bucharest (38 %) or the rest of the country (28 %). 
 
The quantitative analysis shows much better results, and the administration 
has made a lot progress with regard to transparency. The situation of the 
activity reports however, shows that the administration is confused, very 
few know what objectives to follow, and a legal or promotion advisor gets 
the task of producing an annual report (there are many departments 
which draft this report, which shows lack of consistency in implementing 
the law). Transparency seems to have grown a lot faster than 
administrative competence.  
 
The situation of administrative measures against corruption is similar. 
Corruption prevention using administrative tools is vital in countries where 
corruption is very much spread, and the justice system very inefficient. 





Although people complain about corruption, especially with regard to 
the magistrates and police (about 60% believe they are corrupt or very 
corrupt, according to the POB 1/2005), but also to city hall staff and local 
councilors (40%), referrals and complaints were received only for 0.2% of 
the cases. Although the staff says the complaint procedures are clearly 
posted, the National Institute for Administration reports similar figures with 
ours. According to INA, 0.2% of the civil servants were punished last year 
for conflicts of interest, incompatibilities or corruption complaints. Only 77 
civil servants, i.e. 0.01% of the total number, received financial 
punishments of any kind. Most of these sanctions have not been 
connected to complaints from the citizens. If the number of complaints 
rose when it became clear that the system works, the administration’s self-
regulating capacity is clear only in the number of 81 referrals sent about 
behavior issues of the civil servants last year. Either there is no corruption, 
or people know that nothing good can come from complaining to the 
administrative supervisors.  
 
The situation is a little better for our sample, which also includes 
magistrates and the Ministry of Interior staff. 74% of these units had no 
complaints about corruption; punishments were given in 15% of the cases. 
Generally speaking, the administration’s capacity of regulating its integrity 
problems without appealing to the slow and costly mechanism of the 
courts of law is very weak.  
 
This very brief picture of Romanian administration triggers a couple of 
immediate recommendations:  
 
1. It is absolutely necessary to have detailed instructions for a meaningful 
activity report which is likely to reflect the activities of the institution 
accurately, and to be used as a control tool. This means that a reporting 
standard should be created, and instructions as to how to collect 
information from within the administration.  
 
2. It is also necessary to have the same publicity mechanism which was 
used for Law 544 employed for corruption prevention. Presently, the 
public does not trust disciplinary committees, or doesn’t know about 
them, and they prefer to keep a low profile. However, the activation of an 
efficient mechanism of administrative complaints would be saving the 
justice system from cumbersome and costly procedures and increase 
public trust in the administration. Instead of having some vague 
promotion campaigns against bribery (which is practiced because 
otherwise nothing would be solved), it would be better to promote the 
administrative anti-corruption referral system. This system needs to be 
activated, however, as it is dormant at the moment.  
 
 
3. Transparency should be pushed forward in certain areas lagging behinds, 
like the Prosecutor’s offices, the Financial Guard and other highly 
hierarchical institutions, or those which were militarized until recently. 
Transparency is the best tool to help these institutions improve their 
performance.  







The Absorption of EU Funds  
A MEASURE OF CAPACITY IN THE ADMINISTRATION AND THE PRIVATE 
SECTOR  
 
Absorbed into other areas of policy where the move is more rapid and  
spectacular (e.g. the judiciary), we tend to forget about the momentous 
struggle of the Romanian public administration to absorb EU funds on the 
pre-accession instruments, as well as to prepare itself for the structural 
funds which are to come after 2007. This is, actually, a struggle with our 
own (limited) management capacity: to create and manage projects, to 
be transparent and spend the money according to strict regulations, 
without waivers and improvisations, both in the public administration and 
in that part of the private sector which is eligible for EU funds. This is a 
unique administrative saga in the modern Romania, as there has never 
been such a high level of foreign assistance available in our country, with 
appropriations of almost 2% of the GDP in 2006, and about 5-6% of the 
GDP in the peak years 2009-2010, extended over such a long period.  
All Romanian governments up to now have tried, in good faith, to 
achieve a higher rate of absorption for EU funds, as this is one of the 
objectives all parties agree on. However, all governments have been 
faced with the same problems, because the government can control and 
speed up only the inputs: building institutions, hiring staff, drafting 
strategies and, sometimes, identifying projects. But, since by the EU rules 
disbursement comes at the end of a project, if everything goes by the 
book, the ability to spend becomes an output indicator. Unfortunately, 
the road from inputs to outputs is where we get stuck.  
In other words, political will, writing strategies and creating institutions with 
EU models are not enough anymore. Actually, the fact that EU funds 
come over us only shows more clearly the kind of weaknesses Romanian 
administration has had for a long time. Just like now, after the coming of 
the EU funds, capital improvements in Romania have always had their 
own distinct features, with passed deadlines and surpassed budgets, with 
adjustments along the way and permanent informal negotiations 
between the client and the beneficiary. This is the institutional culture of 
punctual derogations and weak budget constraints, of contracts with 
orientative value only, which the Balkan-style communism only reinforced.  






Spending money on pre-accession instruments  
It is difficult to provide a short and comprehensive indicator of 
performance in this domain, and it will not be very useful anyway, 
especially because of the complicated structure of assistance available. 
The absorption and impact issues vary a lot from one program to another, 
depending on the nature and size of these programs, on the institutions 
which manage them or the types of beneficiaries. The fewest but largest 
projects are those in ISPA, the instrument which provides funds for large 
transportation and environment infrastructure; it is easier to measure 
progress in such projects. The situation in early 2006 is presented in Tab. 1.  
 
Table 1. ISPA Situation in February 2006 
Total budget (UE+Ro), 2000-2006 2,880 bn. €  
Total EU grant  2,160 bn. € 75% 
Contracted funds  1 bn € 35% 
Payments made to the projects  340 mil € 12% 
The first projects were approved in 2000. The last projects will have to be 
approved in 2006. The final payments are to be made by mid-2010.  
Source: EC Delegation  
Of course the percentages must be interpreted cautiously: only part of 
them were approved in the first 1-2 years, it takes time to prepare works 
contracts subsequently, so we can safely say that it is natural to have 
more payment accumulated towards the end of the period. However, 
the level of payments is quite low and the pace of signing contracts is not 
very satisfactory, either, because, at least theoretically, we are more than 
halfway down the period when the money can be used.  
The other two pre-accession instruments, PHARE and SAPARD, have higher 
absorption rates. For the former, this rate has always been around 95%. But 
the instruments are difficult to compare because their structures vary a lot. 
PHARE, the oldest and largest of the three instruments in terms of funding24, 
is also the most diverse, because it includes capacity building technical 
assistance and exchanges in various fields, cross-border projects, but also 
the “Economic and Social Cohesion” component, an anticipation of the 
Sectoral Operational Programs and the Regional Operational Program 
after 2007. Because of its various interventions, local private and public 
infrastructure, grants for SMEs, HR investment, social and civil society 
projects and so on, PHARE allowed more internal freedom to shift funds 
between components.  
SAPARD, the assistance for rural development that anticipates the large 
similar program to be funded from CAP after 2007, stands witness for the 
                                                 
24 The approximate proportion of annual allocations between PHARE, ISPA and SAPARD is 
3:2:1.  
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different type of problems encountered with the measures targeting the 
local governments and the private agro sector. Interest is high in small 
rural infrastructure projects (roads and water supply/sewage works), and 
this component was over-subscribed  by 100%. In contrast, for the other 
measures, mostly focused on farms and private entrepreneurs, the 
authorities did not get the answers they expected from the potential 
beneficiaries, due to lack of information, lack of matching funds, or 
maybe because of administrative hindrances in accessing the funds or, 
simply, because of the weaknesses of the private agricultural sector.  
Finally the new EDIS system (Extended Decentralization Implementation 
System) which must be applied in the management of funds after 2007, 
transfers more responsibilities on the Romanian side than the current one 
(DIS). There won’t be thorough examinations and step-by-step approvals 
of the European Commission after 2007, only the global, strategic control, 
and some random monitoring, which means that the moral hazard is 
increased if the tracking of contract implementation stages by the 
Romanian side is weak.  
 
Systemic Issues  
In a meeting with politicians, experts and officials involved in the 
administration of EU funds in Romania, organized by SAR at the end of 
2005, the following list of systemic problems in program implementation 
were discerned.  
• Generally speaking, individual projects or sub-measures of a program 
are developed separately as stand-alone goals, and not as part of a 
larger economic development strategy. When two lines of funding are 
implemented at the same time, potential synergies are lost because 
the programs are not correlated in terms of mechanisms and 
priorities25.  
• Rigid appropriation systems can hinder the efficient allocation of 
resources, flexible matching funds or private-public partnerships;  
• The preliminary selection of projects by the Romanian side is often 
poor, because of insufficient technical capacities. This leads to some 
incomplete projects being sent to Brussels (with unavoidable delays, 
back and forth circulation and the need to add more documents);  
• The contracting authorities in charge with the projects or those which 
have to assist beneficiaries are oftentimes passive, in a defensive 
mood. Engaged and proactive project management, focused on 
finding solutions for the unpredictable problems which are inevitable, 
efficient management of funds or management based on objectives 
are rare birds in public institutions.  
• There is still no strong system of institutional incentives to take into 
account the maintenance and operational costs at their real value in 
a capital improvement project. Generally speaking, the usefulness of 
                                                 
25 An interview with the official of RDA North-East, referring to the grant schemes for SMEs 
and professional training/retraining programs.  





the capital investments tends to be underestimated, and the 
associated costs underrated, which leads to an exaggerate number of 
such requests.  
• There is limited expertise in Romania for the certification of project 
payments for ISPA, SAPARD or in the investment part of PHARE, in the 
public or private sector. After 2007, together with the multiplication of 
the available funds, this lack may bring on payment delays.  
• There is a deficit of qualified human resources, a high employee 
turnover and relatively small salaries in the public institutions 
implementing or supervising the EU projects. Over the past several 
years, the average time spent by a well-qualified youth in such an 
institution was 2-3 years, followed by a move to the private sector. This 
means the leaving individual took with them all the tacit experience 
and investment made through training. There are some signs of 
improvement in 2006, and we hope to have more stable staff after the 
government decided to raise the salaries of the staff involved in EU 
projects.  
• Although everybody admits that any existing institutional resource, with 
competence and expertise to work on foreign projects should be fully 
used in order to improve absorption, this doesn’t happen in real life. 
There are well established and operational structures like FRDS26 which 
couldn’t find a place in the architecture of EU funds, because they 
were not subordinated to one of the ministries which will receive 
management authority after 2007. Because FRDS is not part of such a 
governmental hierarchy, it was not included among the intermediaries 
or even among the implementers, although it has a wide network of 
community facilitators and is well experienced in managing domestic 
and foreign public funds. This is, probably, the only public agency with 
people deployed in the field that can go to poor communities and 
help them directly to generate and mange projects throughout the 
management cycle – which SAPARD, for instance doesn’t have. 
Moreover, ministries without any capacities now strive to create 
territorial offices from scratch, but only in several county seats, and 
they cannot find experienced staff.27. 
As if this was not enough, some additional complications will come after 
2007:  
a. The absolute level of available amounts will increase gradually until the 
peak years 2009-2010, as against the pre-accession time;  
b. The funding rules will be applied more drastically, which hasn’t been 
the case until now, when the status was more relaxed for 
“pedagogical” reasons. One of the most important rules is the "n+3"28, 
meaning that the money allocated in one year must be committed to 
                                                 
26 The Romanian Social Development Fund, a public agency running small projects in 
isolated rural communities, with money from the state budget or the World Bank. 
27 _ The Analysis of Absorption Capacity of Structural Funds in Romania. Pre-accession 
Impact Studies series III. European Institute, Bucharest. January 2006. 
28 N+2 until the European Council of December 2005. 
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a project in almost 36 months, or they are lost. Until now, in some big 
projects, the actual commitment time was n+4, so the money would 
have been lost if the rule had been applied to the letter.  
 
Encouraging Developments  
As the government was dutifully warned about the absorption problems, it 
sped up the preparations lately, especially at the institutional level. 
Sustained efforts have been made to finalize the structures of fund 
management bodies, especially at the subnational level. As we said, the 
remuneration policy for the staff involved in EU projects has changed; 
steps have been taken in SAPARD to assist the farmers who want to 
access funding on the accredited measures; and it looks like the portfolio 
of projects for the environment is well set for the next years.  
The most promising developments are those made at the European 
Council in December 2005, when certain decisions were made which will 
smoothen the absorption of funds in Romania and Bulgaria. These 
decisions did not change the actual amounts – and, therefore, were not 
much discussed by the public in the two countries – but the allocation 
rules, helping to ease the real bottlenecks. This is actually a matter of 
increased flexibility and reducing the burden of the matching funds for 
the poorer EU members.  
 
Recommendations  
Therefore, there is much to do in order to provide Romania with a good 
absorption of EU funds, and part of these measures are already on the 
government’s agenda. Our proposals would make up a list of simple, 
inexpensive measures which could be put in practice starting next week, 
without much institutional change.  
• The key word should be transparency: not only with regard to 
strategies, the content of projects and the initial budgets, but also 
regarding the implementation and the performance indicators, 
physical and financial. So far, no such information is available to the 
public from the Romanian authorities. 
• In order to understand the area of EU funds and identify issues earlier, 
the Romanian authorities must apply the good practice of 
commissioning independent assessments of the status of absorption, 
globally or for each field of activity.  
• The concerns and uncertainties at the subnational level (regional, 
county, local) must be considered with greater attention, as many 
future beneficiaries of structural funds still don’t know how the funding 
will be carried on, or what the institutional arrangements will be.  
• Horizontal, inter-sectoral communication – among post-2007 POSs in EU 
terms – is not the main strength of Romanian administration. Lack of 
coordination won’t affect the absorption figures in these “soft” areas 
too much, but they may reduce the final impact of the projects.  





• Generally speaking, it would be recommended to put to better use 
the current institutions, which already have experience in running 
programs, and be more conservative with the building of new 
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